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Growth Effects of Education and 
Social Capital in the OECD Countries 
Jonathan Temple* 
Abstract: This paper surveys the empirical literature on the 
growth effects of education and social capital. The main fo-
cus is on the cross-country evidence for the OECD coun-
tries, but the paper also briefly reviews evidence from la-
bour economics, to clarify where empirical work on educa-
tion using macro data may be relatively useful. It is argued 
that on balance, the recent cross-country evidence points to 
productivity benefits of education that are at least as large 
as those identified by labour economists. The paper also 
discusses the implications of this finding. Finally, the paper 
reviews the emerging literature on the benefits of social 
capital. Since this literature is still in its early days, policy 
conclusions are accordingly harder to find. 
1. Introduction 
Public and private expenditure on educational institutions accounts for just over 
6% of the collective GDP of the OECD member countries, or roughly $1550 
billion each year.1 This figure understates the true opportunity cost of educa-
tional investments, since it does not take into account forgone earnings. Over-
all, it should be clear that the provision of education represents a major com-
                                                          
*  The article was prepared for the OECD and was first published in OECD Economic Stud-
ies, No. 33, 2001, p. 57-101. The views expressed here do not necessarily represent those of 
the OECD or its member governments. I am grateful to Gavin Cameron, Damon Clark, 
Martine Durand, Jørgen Elmeskov, Tom Healy, John Martin, Mark Pearson and Dirk Pilat 
for very helpful comments on an earlier draft. Any errors are my responsibility. 
  Address all communications to Jonathan Temple, Department of Economics, University of 
Bristol, 8 Woodland Road, Bristol BS8 1TN, UK. E-Mail: Jon.Temple@bristol.ac.uk 
1  The expenditure share is taken from OECD (2000a) and relates to 1997. Collective GDP is 
based on total GDP in 2000 for twenty-nine of the thirty current OECD members, at current 
prices and exchange rates, where the Slovak Republic is the country excluded. The GDP 
figure is taken from the national accounts statistics available online at http://www.oecd.org/ 
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mitment of resources within the OECD, and so measuring the associated wel-
fare benefits is an important task. 
One aim of this survey is to examine the available evidence on the benefits 
of education in developed countries. The main focus is restricted to the effects 
of education on labour productivity, a topic for which there is a considerable 
body of evidence, admittedly indirect. I will draw on research from two fields 
in particular: labour economics, and cross-country empirical work on economic 
growth. An underlying argument will be that, although the labour economics 
literature does an impressive job of measuring the private returns to education, 
it remains the case that macroeconomic studies have a complementary role to 
play. 
The emphasis throughout is very much on education, rather than on any 
broader concept of human capital. The chief omission is any consideration of 
training. This does not reflect my view of its relative significance, but rather 
the focus of the present survey on cross-country evidence. The nature of train-
ing varies considerably across countries, and in the manufacturing sector is 
tightly connected to production strategies (Broadberry and Wagner 1996). It is 
difficult to capture these differences in ways that lend themselves to empirical 
modelling. This means that, in explaining productivity differences across 
OECD countries, the cross-country evidence has little to say about the role of 
training, despite its potential importance.2 This is one area in which answers 
should be sought from labour economics and detailed comparisons of practices 
in individual countries, rather than from the cross-country empirical work re-
viewed here. 
A second theme of the survey is the relation between growth and what has 
come to be known as ‘social capital’. It is difficult to arrive at a precise defini-
tion of this term, and I will discuss this issue in more detail later on. For now, it 
can be thought of as capturing such things as the extent of trustworthiness, so-
cial norms, and participation in networks and associations. In the last few 
years, some prominent academics and commentators have argued that these 
qualities of societies are potentially valuable not only in themselves, but also 
because they make a contribution to economic success. This is another area in 
which cross-country evidence may have something worthwhile to contribute, 
and later in the paper, I will review the small but growing literature on the cor-
relations between measures of social capital and economic performance. 
Empirical work on social capital and growth is a very recent development, 
and with this in mind, I devote the majority of the survey to research on educa-
                                                          
2  One consequence of this omission is that I will have to ignore the interaction between edu-
cation and training. To the extent that education is about ‘learning how to learn’, it may 
have consequences for the value of subsequent on-the-job training. Some international 
comparisons of training programmes can be found in OECD (1998, ch. 3). The work of van 
Ark and Pilat (1993) includes an examination of the role of vocational skills in explaining 
productivity differences across Germany, Japan and the United States. 
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tion and growth. Section 2 provides the theoretical background, and shows that 
recent models provide some good reasons for seeing education as a central de-
terminant of economic growth. Section 3 turns to the empirical evidence. It 
starts with a brief account of research in labour economics, an essential step in 
understanding where the cross-country evidence may be relatively useful. The 
rest of the section, perhaps the heart of the survey, covers evidence from 
growth accounting and growth regressions, recent attempts to measure exter-
nalities to education, and some work on wider benefits.  
The second part of the paper turns to social capital and growth. Section 4 
discusses the definition of social capital, reviews the macroeconomic evidence 
on its growth effects, and briefly discusses the prospects for further research in 
this area. Section 5 rounds off with some possible conclusions. 
2. The growth effects of education: theory 
The aim of this section is to investigate whether formal models shed any light 
on the claim that education plays a central role in growth.3 Can the possible 
role of education be given a secure foundation in terms of economic theory? 
How plausible are the necessary assumptions? Do the models capture the 
growth effects of education, as it is generally defined and understood, or of 
something else? 
One of the most prominent and influential contributions is that of Lucas 
(1988), which is in turn related to previous work by Uzawa (1965). In these 
models, the level of output is a function of the stock of human capital. In the 
long run, sustained growth is only possible if human capital can grow without 
bound. This makes it difficult to interpret the Uzawa-Lucas conception of hu-
man capital in terms of the variables traditionally used to measure educational 
attainment, such as years of schooling. Their use of the term ‘human capital’ 
seems more closely related to knowledge, rather than to skills acquired through 
education. 
One way to relate the Uzawa-Lucas model to the data is to suggest that the 
quality of education could be increasing over time (Bils and Klenow 2000). In 
this view, the knowledge imparted to schoolchildren in the year 2000 is supe-
rior to the knowledge that would have been imparted in 1950 or 1900, and will 
make a greater difference to their productivity in later employment. Even if 
average educational attainment is constant over time, the stock of human capi-
tal could be increasing in a way that drives rising levels of output.4 
                                                          
3  A more detailed and rigorous summary can be found in Aghion and Howitt (1998, ch. 10). 
4  Note that this effect is potentially independent of other benefits of increased knowledge, 
such as increases in the quality of capital goods, or more general forms of technical pro-
gress. 
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Yet this argument runs into difficulties, even at the level of university edu-
cation. There may be some degree courses in which the knowledge imparted 
currently has a greater effect on productivity than before (medicine, computer 
science, perhaps economics) but there are other, less vocational qualifications 
for which this argument is less convincing. At the level of primary and secon-
dary schooling, with their focus on basic skills such as literacy and numeracy, 
the idea that increases in the quality of schooling drive sustained growth seems 
even harder to support. Finally, note that these models are typically silent on 
exactly how the increase in the quality of schooling is brought about: individu-
als can raise the stock of human capital, or knowledge, simply by allocating 
some of their time to its accumulation. 
An alternative class of models places more emphasis on modelling the in-
centives that firms have to generate new ideas. Endogenous growth models 
based on the analysis of research and development, notably the landmark con-
tribution of Romer (1990), yield the result that the steady-state growth rate 
partly depends on the level of human capital. The underlying assumption is that 
human capital is a key input in the production of new ideas. In contrast with the 
Uzawa-Lucas framework, this opens up the possibility that even a one-off in-
crease in the stock of human capital will raise the growth rate indefinitely. In-
deed, in many endogenous growth models, human capital must be above a 
threshold level for any innovation to take place at all. 
In practice, the generality of these results, and the contrast with the Uzawa-
Lucas model, should not be overdrawn. The Uzawa-Lucas framework can be 
seen as a model of knowledge accumulation in a similar spirit to that of Romer, 
but easier to analyse; and restrictive assumptions are needed to yield the Romer 
result that the long-run growth rate depends on the level of human capital 
(Jones 1995). But even under more general assumptions, a rise in the level of 
human capital is likely to be associated with a potentially substantial rise in the 
level of output, brought about through a transitional increase in growth rates. 
In most endogenous growth models based on research and development, the 
stock of human capital is taken to be exogenously determined. More recent 
papers, notably Acemoglu (1997) and Redding (1996), have relaxed this as-
sumption, and considered what happens when individuals can choose to make 
investments in education or training, while firms make investments in R&D. 
For some parameter values, multiple equilibria are possible, since the incen-
tives of workers to invest in human capital, and those of firms to invest in 
R&D, are interdependent. This provides a way of formalizing earlier ideas 
about the possible existence of a “low-skill, low-quality trap” in which low 
skill levels and slow rates of innovation reflect a coordination failure (Finegold 
and Soskice, 1988). The models suggest that, at the aggregate level, greater 
investments in education or training might raise expenditure on R&D, and vice 
versa. 
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Another interesting aspect of recent growth models is their suggestion that 
individuals may under-invest in education. Rustichini and Schmitz (1991) ex-
amine this argument in some detail. They present a model in which individuals 
divide their time between production, original research, and the acquisition of 
knowledge. Each individual knows that acquiring knowledge (through educa-
tion) will raise their productivity in subsequent research, but since they do not 
fully capture the benefits of research, they will tend to spend too little time ac-
quiring knowledge relative to the socially optimal outcome.5 Rustichini and 
Schmitz calibrate a simple model, and find that although policy intervention 
has only small effects on the allocation of time to education, it can have a sub-
stantial effect on the growth rate.6  
More recently, Romer (2000) has pointed out that models of growth driven 
by R&D should potentially inform education policy. He notes that, in the mod-
els reviewed above, growth is determined by the quantity of inputs used in 
R&D, not simply expenditure upon it. One reason this point matters is that in-
centives to encourage R&D, such as tax credits, may be ineffective unless they 
encourage a greater number of scientists and engineers to work towards devel-
oping new ideas. To illustrate this, consider a very simple model, in which a 
fixed supply of scientists only work in R&D and are the only input to the re-
search process. Then an increase in R&D spending will simply raise the wages 
of scientists, with no effect on the number of researchers engaged in R&D, or 
the growth rate. 
In a more general and realistic model, there will be some effect of greater 
R&D spending on total research inputs and therefore growth.7 To create a large 
effect, higher wages for scientists should encourage more individuals to train as 
scientists. This requires some flexibility on the part of the education system, 
and in the provision of relevant information to potential students. So the effec-
tiveness of direct subsidies or tax credits for R&D may be enhanced by com-
plementary education policies, aimed at improving or subsidizing the supply of 
research inputs, rather than simply the demand for them. 
In summary, the models of the new growth theory are important for several 
reasons. First, they see human capital as an important input in the creation of 
new ideas, and this mechanism provides a relatively appealing justification for 
viewing education as a central determinant of growth rates, even over long time 
intervals. Second, they sometimes yield the result that the laissez-faire outcome 
delivers slower growth than is socially optimal. Third, the models suggest that 
policy-makers wishing to raise the level of output have several options: not just 
                                                          
5  The assumption that it is difficult to fully capture the benefits of research is uncontroversial. 
The presence of substantial research spillovers is intuitively plausible, and supported by 
empirical evidence. Griliches (1992) provides a survey. 
6  A complete welfare analysis of policy intervention would need to consider the effects on 
the level of the output path, as well as its growth rate. 
7  For example, some individuals outside the R&D sector, but originally trained as scientists, 
may switch into R&D careers in response to higher wages. 
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direct support for R & D - which may be difficult to implement and monitor - 
but also subsidies to certain kinds of education, perhaps especially those which 
could lead to later work in research and development. 
3. The growth effects of education: evidence 
As we have seen, theoretical models imply that, in searching for the determi-
nants of growth, policy on education is one of the first places to look. In this 
section, I will turn to the attempts of economists to quantify education’s impor-
tance. The main focus will be on the macroeconomic evidence: the body of 
research which measures, or attempts to measure, the productivity benefits of 
education using the variation in educational attainment and growth rates across 
countries.8 
It would be a mistake, however, to review this evidence without first dis-
cussing the work on education and earnings by labour economists. If education 
affects productivity directly, this tends to imply an observable relationship be-
tween an individual’s education and their earnings. The evidence for these ef-
fects is the best established in the literature, and an understanding of its 
strengths and weaknesses helps place the cross-country evidence in context. 
This will clarify the areas in which the macro approach may have something 
worthwhile to contribute, and also point to the areas in which micro evidence is 
more likely to be fruitful. 
With this in mind, section 3.1 reviews studies of the effects of education 
based on earnings surveys. Later sections cover growth accounting (3.2), the 
evidence from cross-country regressions (3.3), recent work on externalities to 
human capital (3.4) and the wider benefits of education (3.5). Finally, section 
3.6 attempts to tie together the various pieces of evidence. 
The review points out that each approach to measuring the productivity ef-
fects of education has its own important weaknesses and areas of uncertainty. 
Yet taken together, the various methods tend to agree in pointing to quite sub-
stantial effects. As a result, it would be difficult to use the available evidence to 
construct a case that education is currently over-provided in the OECD as a 
whole, and perhaps even harder if one acknowledged the wider benefits dis-
cussed in section 3.5 below. 
Broadly speaking, this work might also justify an expansion of educational 
provision in some countries, especially those where current policies imply rela-
tively low levels of attainment in future years. A full analysis of policy ques-
tions, however, would need both to acknowledge the potential importance of 
                                                          
8  Sianesi and Van Reenen (2000) also provide a review of the macroeconomic literature on 
education and growth, with extra detail on individual papers. Scarpetta et al. (2000) analyse 
the recent growth performance of OECD member countries in more general terms. 
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training, and to investigate how a given quantity of educational spending is best 
allocated; these topics are beyond the scope of the present review.9  
Before turning to the various strands of evidence in more detail, it may be 
helpful to clarify the concepts of productivity that the different approaches 
have in mind. At the level of individuals, output per worker hour seems the 
most relevant measure of productivity, not least because one benefit of an in-
crease in hourly productivity may be that individuals choose to work fewer 
hours. In examining productivity differences across countries, however, there 
are sometimes disadvantages in using output per worker hour as the basis for 
comparison. This measure of productivity is affected by labour force participa-
tion rates, and other aspects of labour market institutions. Further discussion 
and some recent evidence can be found in Scarpetta et al. (2000). 
It is also worth pointing out that, for some purposes, policy-makers are in-
terested in output per worker and output per head, as well as output per worker 
hour. Education may also have indirect effects on these variables, not simply 
through hourly productivity. For example, education is often thought to affect 
labour force participation, particularly that of women.10 It may also affect the 
non-monetary benefits associated with work and leisure, and so affect working 
hours. Since cross-country empirical work is typically based on output per cap-
ita or output per worker, it will tend to conflate these effects with the direct 
impact of education on labour productivity that labour economists have sought 
to quantify. 
3.1 Evidence from labour economics 
This section reviews evidence from labour economics. Rather than attempt to 
provide a summary of a vast empirical literature, the emphasis will be on how 
the conventional findings should be interpreted, and to what extent we can infer 
genuine effects of education on productivity.11 
Researchers in this field typically study the link between education and pro-
ductivity using survey data on the earnings and characteristics of large numbers 
of individuals. The techniques used to analyse these data have become increas-
ingly sophisticated, and we will see that evidence from ‘natural experiments’ 
provides measures of the private return to education that are probably quite 
                                                          
9  An innovative paper by Judson (1998) investigates whether educational spending is allo-
cated efficiently. It seems likely that future research will give increasing emphasis to this 
topic. 
10  The interaction between growth, human capital and female labour force participation is 
discussed in more detail by Mincer (1996). For evidence on female labour force participa-
tion in the OECD, see OECD (1998, ch. 4). 
11  Card (1999) and Harmon et al. (2000) provide excellent and detailed reviews of the various 
issues. Another useful survey is that of Ashenfelter et al. (1999), which includes a detailed 
investigation of problems associated with publication bias. 
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accurate. There is much greater disagreement on the extent to which labour 
economists have identified the social return to education.12 For example, educa-
tional qualifications may be valued in the labour market because they act as a 
signal of ability. As a result, private returns to schooling may be high even if 
education has no effect on productivity. This argument will be discussed fur-
ther below. 
In analysing the private return, the standard empirical approach is to explain 
the variation in earnings across individuals using regressions, where the ex-
planatory variables include years of schooling, either age or a simple proxy for 
labour market experience, and other characteristics. The most popular specifi-
cation draws heavily on the work of Mincer (1974), and earlier contributions 
on ‘human capital earnings functions’. The starting point is typically a specifi-
cation that looks something like this:  
2
210ln EESw βββα +++=  (1) 
which relates the natural logarithm of wages (w) to years of schooling (S) and a 
proxy for labour market experience (E). Under some assumptions, and given 
the semi-logarithmic formulation, the coefficient on schooling can be inter-
preted as the private return to education. Empirical estimates of the private re-
turn typically have a relatively small standard error and lie somewhere between 
5% and 15%, depending on the time and country. If workers are paid their 
marginal product, these educational wage differentials may also tell us some-
thing useful about the effect of education on productivity. 
The evidence that earnings are positively associated with schooling is robust 
and uncontroversial; the obvious difficulty lies in giving this association a 
causal interpretation. One of the most easily understood problems is that, 
through lack of suitable data, the regressions inevitably omit some important 
variables that are likely to be correlated with both schooling and earnings. 
Family background and traits such as innate ability or determination are nota-
ble examples. 
The basic problem, from the econometrician’s point of view, is that the 
group of people with a relatively advanced level of educational attainment is 
not a random selection from the population as a whole. For example, if more 
able individuals have relatively high earnings regardless of extra education, and 
also choose to spend more time in school, then the estimated return to school-
ing overstates the effect of education on productivity. If ability is not observed 
by employers, then the regression estimate may still capture the private return 
to schooling, but it will not capture the social return that is ultimately our main 
interest. 
                                                          
12  Different authors use the term ‘social return’ in different ways. Here I will use it denote the 
overall return on an individual’s education from society’s point of view, rather than (say) 
the private return simply adjusted for taxation and direct costs of education. 
 13
Unfortunately the problems do not stop there. It seems probable that the 
costs and benefits of education vary across individuals, perhaps substantially. 
Indeed, this is likely to be the principal cause of the variation in completed 
schooling that the econometrician uses to identify the effects of education. The 
heterogeneity will typically mean that the private returns to education vary 
across individuals. In the unlikely case where the returns vary independently of 
the explanatory variables, the regressions should still recover an unbiased esti-
mate of the average return. More generally, however, the heterogeneity prob-
lem will lead to biased estimates. 
The recent focus of the literature on education has been on identifying natu-
ral experiments, in the hope that these will allow stronger claims about causal-
ity to be made. Researchers look for situations in which the level of schooling 
varies across individuals for reasons that are likely to be independent of the 
unobserved characteristics of those individuals (ability, determination, and so 
on). 
The idea is best explained by means of an example. A good starting point is 
one of the most influential papers, by Angrist and Krueger (1991). The paper 
starts from the observation that, when it is compulsory to stay in school until a 
certain age, individuals born earlier in the calendar year will reach the legal 
minimum age for school-leavers at an earlier stage in their education. As a di-
rect result, there is likely to be a correlation between an individual’s quarter of 
birth and their length of schooling. The correlation means that quarter of birth 
can potentially be used to identify exogenous variation in schooling - that is, 
variation independent of unobserved characteristics like ability or determina-
tion. In econometric terms, quarter of birth can  be used as an instrument for 
schooling, under the maintained assumption that personal characteristics other 
than schooling are independent of quarter of birth. Somewhat surprisingly, An-
grist and Krueger find that the instrumental variable estimates of the return to 
schooling are similar to the least squares estimates, supporting the idea that 
conventional estimates are reasonably accurate.13 
Another much-discussed natural experiment is provided by identical twins 
who have different levels of schooling. Given that such twins have the same 
genes, and will usually share the same family background, the wage differential 
between twins with different years of schooling may provide useful informa-
tion on the productivity effect of education. Finally, other natural experiments 
are provided by the possible connection between the geographical proximity of 
colleges to individuals, and their choice of schooling (see Card 1999). 
Research of this kind has considerably strengthened the case for productiv-
ity effects of education, but even these studies retain an important weakness. It 
has long been understood that the private return to education may be a poor 
                                                          
13  Space precludes a full discussion of the interpretation of these results, and their robustness. 
For a more detailed review, see Harmon et al. (2000).  
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guide to the social return. The theoretical work of Spence (1973) indicated that 
educational attainment may be valued by employers mainly because it acts as a 
signal of innate ability, and not because it has an effect on productivity. 
Models of signalling start from the observation that individuals have traits 
which employers value but do not fully observe at the time of hiring (ability, 
determination, and so on). If there is a systematic association between these 
traits and the costs and benefits of education, this may lead to an equilibrium in 
which high-ability individuals stay in school for longer because this decision 
signals their ability to employers. This argument provides a plausible reason for 
a correlation between ability and years of schooling, and suggests that earnings 
may be correlated with schooling even if schooling has no effect on productiv-
ity. 
Few doubt that signalling plays some role in explaining educational wage 
differentials, but its overall importance remains controversial. Weiss (1995) 
and Quiggin (1999) provide very different perspectives on the theoretical gen-
erality and empirical validity of signalling models. There are two main argu-
ments against such models, which note the implications of the assumption that 
education has no effect on productivity. First, given the wage premium earned 
by those with more years of schooling, employers would probably have strong 
incentives to conduct their own tests of ability and other characteristics, and 
use this direct information rather than the somewhat indirect signal provided by 
the schooling decision. This view is supported by evidence that measured per-
formance in school and universities is correlated quite strongly with the out-
comes of tests carried out at an earlier stage (see Quiggin 1999 for references). 
Yet the argument is not conclusive, mainly because employers may not be able 
to appropriate the returns to acquiring more information about their employees; 
other firms could bid away those workers found to have higher ability (Stiglitz 
1975). 
The second argument is that, if education does not affect productivity, one 
would expect to see the educational wage differential decline with job tenure, 
as employers acquire direct knowledge of the characteristics of their employ-
ees. This does not seem to be observed in the data, although this question has 
not received the sustained attention it probably deserves. 
More generally, there is clearly room to develop and test signalling argu-
ments in more detail. This is important not least because, as Weiss (1995) has 
pointed out, even the results of natural experiments are not necessarily incon-
sistent with the signalling view of education. To see this, recall that employers 
may use years of schooling to gain information about characteristics that are 
not observed at the time of hiring. The results from the Angrist and Krueger 
quarter-of-birth study and the work on twins can easily be interpreted in terms 
of these signalling effects, and so one could still defend even the extreme view 
that productivity is entirely independent of education. 
 15
For now, let us assume that employers fully observe all relevant characteris-
tics, and hence do not infer any information about them from schooling deci-
sions. Even in this case, as Card notes, not much is presently known about the 
mechanisms by which education might contribute to higher wages. The sim-
plest interpretation of the evidence from earnings functions is that more edu-
cated individuals are more productive, whatever their chosen occupation. In 
practice, a college degree is unlikely to make one a noticeably better postman 
or roadsweeper. 
Education’s role may be to equip workers for the task of working with more 
advanced technologies, for providing a higher quality of service, or for ‘learn-
ing by doing’ in the course of employment. Understanding the mechanisms 
could be important, and will have implications for the interpretation of earnings 
functions. For instance, more educated workers may have better access to those 
jobs in which workers share some of the rents earned by imperfectly competi-
tive firms. If mechanisms like this are at work, there would again be less reason 
to believe that the observed correlation between schooling and earnings repre-
sents solely a direct productivity effect. 
There are other ways in which private and social returns could differ. In 
some countries, especially poorer ones, the public sector is a major employer of 
the well-educated. As Pritchett (1996) emphasises, the assumption that wage 
differentials reflect differences in marginal products is much harder to sustain 
in this context. If educational credentials are used as a means of determining 
access to rationed high-paying jobs in the public sector, estimated earnings 
functions may detect an effect of education even when it has little or no effect 
on productivity. 
The general problem is that estimates of earnings functions capture, at best, 
the private return to education, yet it is the social return which is of most inter-
est to policy-makers. The two may diverge for a number of reasons, including 
the possibility that education acts mainly as a signalling device. The arguments 
discussed above imply that the social return to education is less than the private 
return, and as we have seen, even just a lower bound on the social returns is 
difficult to establish. 
There are also some reasons to believe that the social return to education 
could exceed the private return. It is plausible that individuals do not fully cap-
ture some of the benefits to society of their schooling, and I will review some 
of the empirical evidence on externalities and wider benefits in sections 3.4 and 
3.5 below. Another important argument is that educational provision may play 
a valuable role in allowing a more efficient matching between workers and jobs 
than would otherwise be possible (Arrow 1973, Stiglitz 1975). In other words, 
even if education does act mainly as a signal, there should not be a presumption 
that education is therefore socially wasteful. 
In summary, there is an ingenious and persuasive body of work which sup-
ports the view that private returns to schooling are quite high. Card (1999) con-
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cludes that the average marginal return to education is unlikely to be far below 
the standard regression estimates. The view that this private return originates in 
a genuine productivity effect is far from universally accepted, however. As 
Weiss (1995) has argued, even the most recent results can be interpreted as the 
outcome of signalling effects. 
This suggests two lines of enquiry that might be particularly fruitful. The 
first is further theoretical examination (and perhaps calibration) of signalling 
models, with a particular focus on the extent to which they can incorporate the 
direct productivity effects envisaged in the traditional theory of human capital. 
Second, more evidence on the extent to which educational wage differentials 
evolve with job tenure could be of great interest in advancing the debate. 
3.2 Growth accounting 
As we have seen, the labour economics literature provides a wealth of evidence 
on the private returns to schooling. It is necessarily silent, however, on the con-
tribution of education relative to other sources of aggregate growth. Making 
assumptions similar to those of labour economists, researchers in the growth 
accounting tradition have set about the complex task of evaluating the overall 
growth contribution of changing educational attainment. This section will de-
scribe the method and review the available evidence.  
Growth accounting essentially divides output growth into a component that 
can be explained by input growth, and a ‘residual’ which captures efficiency 
change, partly reflecting changes in technology.14 In explaining the change in 
output, the change in the quantity of each input is weighted by its marginal 
product, proxied by its market reward. This principle can be extended to any 
number of inputs, and where sufficiently detailed data are available, it is possi-
ble to disaggregate the labour force into various categories, where each type of 
worker is weighted by the average wage of that type. 
For instance, in analysing the contribution of changes in educational attain-
ment, the researcher disaggregates the labour force by level of schooling, and 
often by other available characteristics such as age and gender. Changes in the 
number of employees at each level of schooling are then weighted by their 
marginal products, proxied by the mean income associated with each schooling 
level, to give the overall change in an index of ‘effective’ or quality-adjusted 
labour. This ultimately allows the researcher to quantify the proportion of out-
put growth that can be directly attributed to increases in educational attainment. 
Griliches (1997) provides a brief but useful survey of this literature, and 
points out the two major assumptions, both of which will have a familiar ring 
to readers of the previous section. First, it is assumed that differences in ob-
                                                          
14  Note that, depending on the approach adopted, some forms of technical change will be 
treated as changes in the quality of capital inputs, and will not appear in the residual. 
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served market rewards correspond reasonably closely to differences in mar-
ginal products. Secondly, the calculations assume that differences in market 
rewards across schooling levels originate in schooling, and not in other factors 
such as native ability or family background that may be correlated with school-
ing. 
The advantage of the first assumption, that market rewards correspond to 
marginal products, is that it allows the growth accountant to obtain theory-
consistent weights using the available data, at least under the assumptions of 
constant returns to scale and perfect competition. Less restrictive frameworks 
are possible, but will generally tend to require additional and perhaps contro-
versial assumptions about parameters. It should also be clear that conventional 
growth accounting will not shed any light on the possible contribution of exter-
nalities. This is a major limitation, and an important motivation for the cross-
country empirical studies that will be considered further below. 
What of the second assumption, that differences in wages originate in 
schooling? The danger here can be seen from considering an extreme scenario, 
in which education has absolutely no effect on an individual’s productivity, but 
more able individuals both spend longer in school and earn more while in em-
ployment. This scenario clearly implies that educational attainment and earn-
ings are positively correlated. Now consider an exogenous increase in the pro-
portion of individuals with the highest level of education: since the index of 
labour quality weights the numbers in each education class by the mean income 
of that class, the index must increase. As a result, the growth accountant will 
attribute some portion of growth to educational improvement, even though 
education plays no role in productivity gains. This implies that, as in the labour 
economics literature, growth accounting can give us some insight into the pro-
ductivity contribution of education, but the answers are by no means complete 
or conclusive. 
Before describing the results of growth accounting exercises in more detail, 
it is important to clarify the connection between changes in educational provi-
sion and the measured effects. An expansion in provision typically affects only 
younger cohorts, and so has long-lived effects on educational attainment in the 
labour force as a whole. Average attainment will continue to increase for some 
time as older, less educated cohorts retire from employment and are replaced 
by the more highly qualified. When using growth accounting methods, it is 
these long-lived effects that are quantified, and one should bear this in mind 
when interpreting specific findings. The practical implication is that results for 
recent years are driven by changes in educational provision much further back 
in time. 
Growth accounting exercises vary widely in the extent to which they disag-
gregate labour input. Nearly all the studies which carry out a detailed disaggre-
gation by level of schooling are restricted to the United States; the classic study 
is Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987). For the period 1948-79, they find 
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that growth in labour input has contributed about a third of growth in aggregate 
value added, where the measure of labour input takes into account both hours 
worked and the quality of labour. Changes in their aggregate index of labour 
quality are based on changes in the composition of total hours worked by age, 
sex, education, employment class and occupation. They find that a favourable 
shift in labour quality is responsible for about a tenth of the growth in value 
added, or about a fifth of the productivity residual that remains after accounting 
for the contribution of growth in physical capital (see their Table 9.5). 
In interpreting the results of Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni, it is important 
to note that some of the compositional shifts within the labour force have a 
negative effect on the index of labour quality over the 1948-79 period, which 
partly offset the benefits of improvements in educational attainment. As previ-
ously noted, the calculation of the labour quality index assumes that differences 
in market rewards reflect genuine differences in marginal products. One conse-
quence is that the increasing entry of women and young workers into the labour 
market, mainly into low-paying jobs, has a negative effect on the aggregate 
index of labour quality. 
Over the 1948-79 period, the negative effect on the index of labour quality 
is more than offset by positive changes in the composition of the labour force 
by educational attainment and occupation. One implication is that the latter 
effects are likely to be responsible for more than a fifth of the productivity re-
sidual, since the favourable shift in labour quality would have been larger in the 
absence of the change in composition by age and sex. 
In reviewing the evidence as a whole, Griliches (1997) writes that increases 
in educational attainment seem to have accounted for perhaps a third of the 
productivity residual in the US over the post-war period. In the 1950s and 
1960s, this would correspond to an effect on the annual growth rate of aggre-
gate output of around 0.5 percentage points; during the 1970s productivity 
slowdown the effect of educational improvement will have been lower, perhaps 
raising the growth rate by 0.2 or 0.3 percentage points. As discussed above, 
these effects are inherently transitional ones, driven by long-standing changes 
in education policy that shift the educational composition of the labour force 
towards a new steady state.  
Other OECD members have also seen important changes in educational at-
tainment in the last fifty years. Englander and Gurney (1994a) note that tertiary 
education in particular has expanded rapidly in many OECD countries since 
1960. More detail on the general trends can be found in OECD (1998, ch. 2) 
and OECD (2000a, 2000b). 
As yet, however, there are few studies that cover recent experience of other 
OECD member countries in the same degree of detail as Jorgenson, Gollop and 
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Fraumeni.15 The best known studies covering a number of developed countries 
for recent years are those of Maddison (1987, 1991). Maddison (1991, p. 138) 
argues that the 20th century saw a fairly steady improvement in educational 
attainment for the six countries he considers (France, West Germany, Japan, 
the Netherlands, the UK and the US). One implication is that changing trends 
in educational attainment are unlikely to provide a satisfactory explanation for 
the transition from Europe’s ‘Golden Age’ of rapid growth (1950-73) to the 
productivity slowdown after 1973. 
For these six countries, Maddison estimates the growth impact of changes in 
educational attainment by disaggregating the labour force into those with pri-
mary, secondary and higher qualifications. He then combines these three dif-
ferent types of labour using weights that are the same across countries and over 
time. In selecting the weights, he follows Denison (1967) in assuming that ob-
served educational wage differentials overstate the contribution of education to 
productivity, for the reasons discussed in section 3.1 above. Inevitably, the ad-
justments made are somewhat arbitrary, but they do serve to highlight the un-
certainty inherent in the general approach. The other point to note is that, be-
cause of these adjustments, the estimates of Denison and Maddison are not 
directly comparable with those of other studies. 
With all this in mind, we can turn to Maddison’s results on the contribution 
of increases in labour quality to output growth in France, West Germany, Ja-
pan, the Netherlands, the UK and the US. His figures suggest that changes in 
the quality of the labour force typically added between 0.1 and 0.5 percentage 
points to annual growth rates between 1950 and 1984 (his Table 20). The Mad-
dison index of labour quality takes into account changes in the male/female 
composition (though not age composition) of the labour force, as well as 
changes in educational attainment. In countries where the proportion of women 
in the labour force has noticeably risen, such as the UK and the US, the contri-
bution of education to growth will be slightly higher than the reported contribu-
tion of growth in labour quality.  
More recent studies include that of Jorgenson and Yip (1999), who have re-
cently carried out a detailed growth accounting exercise for the G7, and present 
estimates of growth in labour quality for 1960-95 (their Table 7). These esti-
mates suggest that labour quality has grown particularly quickly in Japan, and 
to a lesser extent, relatively quickly in France and the US. The Jorgenson-Yip 
disaggregation of the labour force is slightly finer than that adopted by Maddi-
son, and this makes it harder to assess the role of education within changes in 
the overall index of labour quality. 
A useful survey by Englander and Gurney (1994b) draws together the re-
sults of a number of studies for the G7, although some of this evidence is based 
                                                          
15  The KLEMS project is seeking to extend this form of analysis to other major economies. 
See http://www.conference-board.org/economics/klems/index.htm 
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on regressions rather than growth accounting. Their summary suggests that for 
the 1960s to 1980s the growth of human capital (sometimes including demo-
graphic effects, of the kind discussed above) typically accounts for a tenth to a 
fifth of growth in total output. For those countries, like the US, where there has 
been a rapid increase in employment, these figures probably slightly understate 
the proportion of growth in output per worker that can be attributed to rising 
attainment. 
Another OECD country for which recent and detailed growth accounting re-
sults are available is Korea. The most influential contribution is that of Young 
(1995), who examines and compares the growth performance of four East 
Asian economies. For the purpose of the present survey, the case of Korea is 
particularly interesting in that the country has seen a dramatic increase in the 
educational attainment of the labour force. Between 1966 and 1990, the pro-
portion of the working population with secondary level education or higher 
roughly trebled, from 27% to 75%. Yet this dramatic expansion does not trans-
late into an equally dramatic effect on the growth rate, at least under the as-
sumptions of growth accounting. For each of the four economies he considers, 
Young finds that the improving educational attainment of the workforce raised 
the annual growth rate of effective labour input by about one percentage point 
(Young 1995, p. 645). 
I end this section by noting an essential qualification to the results above, 
and a possible extension to the conventional approach. All growth accounting 
results require careful interpretation, because the approach does not tell us eve-
rything we need to know about the relevant counterfactual.16 As an example, 
consider a claim that X percentage points of growth in a given country is due to 
a change in the quality of the labour force. This does not imply that, in the ab-
sence of the change in labour force quality, the growth rate of output would 
have been precisely X percentage points lower. The problem is that educational 
attainment may have other, indirect effects on output through labour force par-
ticipation, investment, and even R&D and the growth of total factor productiv-
ity. Growth accounting does not capture these indirect effects, and so gives 
only a partial picture of the overall importance to growth of variables like edu-
cation. 
Finally, although accounting decompositions are usually applied to growth 
rates, the same ideas can be applied to decompositions of output levels. We can 
then ask questions such as: to what extent do differences in educational attain-
ment explain the variation in GDP per capita across OECD member countries? 
Research applying such ideas is just starting to emerge, and Woessmann (2000) 
discusses the approach in more detail. Working on the assumption that meas-
ured private returns to schooling are capturing a genuine productivity effect of 
                                                          
16 Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, p. 352) make this point in greater detail. 
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education, his analysis suggests that differences in educational attainment ac-
count for most of the output variation across OECD members. 
3.3 Evidence from growth regressions 
Although growth accounting exercises are informative and often useful, it is 
clear that they are not a complete substitute for other forms of investigation, 
given the necessary assumptions. Griliches (1997, p. S333) writes that “the 
main, and possibly only, approach to testing the productivity of schooling di-
rectly is to include it as a separate variable in an estimated production func-
tion”. Such estimates could be at the level of firms or regions, but much of the 
evidence uses the variation in education across countries, and it is to such esti-
mates that I turn next. 
The key attraction of growth regressions is that they provide a way of testing 
directly for productivity effects of education. This has sometimes been noted in 
the theoretical literature: Arrow (1973, p. 215) pointed out that the use of mac-
roeconomic evidence would be one way of testing the signalling arguments, 
although he also expressed doubts about the likely reliability of such an ap-
proach. 
Recent work has led to a better understanding of precisely when and where 
scepticism might be justified. In what follows, I will review the most important 
problems associated with measuring growth effects of education at the macro-
economic level. An underlying theme is that, despite these problems, there are 
some grounds for optimism that this research can yet make a worthwhile con-
tribution. 
This may seem surprising, given that several well-known papers in this field 
take very different views on the importance of education. The argument below 
is that a more coherent story is gradually starting to appear, in which the results 
of cross-country studies increasingly look consistent with the effects identified 
by labour economists, and which can also explain why some earlier studies 
failed to detect any significant effect of education using aggregate data. 
In the early work in this field, some of the estimated effects looked too large 
to be credible, as will be discussed further below. One of the best known and 
most influential contributions to the empirical growth literature is that of 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). If taken at face value, their parameter esti-
mates for an OECD sample imply that if human capital investment (as a share 
of GDP) is increased by a tenth, output per worker will rise by 6%; if invest-
ment in human capital is doubled, output per worker will eventually rise by 
about 50%.17  
                                                          
17  Other papers which extend these findings for the OECD sample, and at least implicitly 
examine their robustness, include Nonneman and Vanhoudt (1996), Temple (1998) and 
Vasudeva Murthy and Chien (1997). 
 22
Results of this kind are often perceived as rather dubious, since all growth 
regressions share a number of important statistical problems (Temple 1999a). 
In the present context, one drawback of most regression studies is their focus 
on a large sample that includes less developed countries as well as OECD 
members. One should clearly be rather wary about drawing conclusions for 
OECD policy based on samples that are often dominated by developing coun-
tries. I will usually concentrate on the few studies that include separate esti-
mates of regressions restricted to either OECD members or rich countries. 
Researchers have generally used one of two specifications in modelling 
growth and education. In the first and most common specification, the re-
searcher chooses to regress growth on control variables and the initial level of 
an education measure, such as the secondary school enrollment rate or (pref-
erably) average years of schooling. The underlying idea is that the stock of hu-
man capital could affect subsequent growth in a variety of ways, notably by 
influencing a country’s ability to adopt technology from abroad.18 The second 
specification uses the change in educational attainment, not its level, to explain 
output growth; this approach will be discussed further below. 
It has sometimes been argued that in practice, one might expect a negative 
effect to emerge from regressions based on the level of education, and this po-
tential ambiguity could make the results hard to interpret (Topel 1999). For 
example, countries with a low level of education may also be relatively far be-
hind technological leaders like the US, and therefore have more opportunities 
to catch-up and grow quickly. Arguments of this kind are not yet altogether 
convincing. In this specific case, one should note that growth regressions usu-
ally control for initial output per worker, and this will incorporate a large part 
of the catch-up effects associated with technological backwardness. 
When researchers relate growth to the initial level of education, they typi-
cally find an effect of schooling that is both large and precisely estimated, at 
least when initial output per worker is also included as an explanatory variable 
(as in Barro 1991). Yet it is not clear that these results are applicable to OECD 
members. In an interesting exercise, Englander and Gurney (1994a) re-estimate 
growth regressions based on four influential papers, including Barro (1991), 
but restricting the sample to the OECD. Three of the four sets of regressions 
include human capital variables, typically primary and secondary school en-
rollment rates.19 These variables turn out to perform relatively well, but are still 
far from robust. In further work, it may be valuable to repeat this exercise, 
                                                          
18  There is also important work on human capital as a determinant of technological catch-up 
using data at the sectoral level. For example, Cameron, Proudman and Redding (1998) in-
vestigate the role of human capital and openness to trade in explaining catch-up by UK 
manufacturing sectors. 
19  Of the two measures, only the secondary school enrollment rate is likely to be relevant in 
explaining growth within the OECD. Englander and Gurney (1994a) report that average 
secondary enrollment in the OECD was about 70% in 1960, so there may be enough varia-
tion across countries for regression evidence to be informative. 
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drawing on more recent data sets that allow one to use average years of school-
ing rather than enrollment rates. 
A more recent paper that includes results specific to OECD samples is 
Gemmell (1996). He emphasises the problems of using enrollment rates, and 
constructs alternative measures of human capital based on attainment at the 
primary, secondary and tertiary levels. For a sample of 21 OECD countries, he 
finds a correlation between the number of people with tertiary qualifications 
and subsequent growth. He also finds some evidence that investment in OECD 
countries is positively correlated with the extent of secondary schooling in the 
labour force. 
One drawback of most cross-country work is the likelihood of important dif-
ferences in the nature and quality of schooling across countries, which could 
undermine the usefulness of international comparisons. Even such things as the 
length of the school year can show a surprising degree of variation across coun-
tries. An alternative data set, which may overcome these problems to some ex-
tent, has been introduced by Hanushek and Kimko (2000). They measure edu-
cational attainment using scores in international tests of cognitive skills in 
maths and science. Their results support the idea that education has a sub-
stantial effect on growth rates, although the applicability to OECD countries is 
not clear.  
The lack of studies with direct relevance to the OECD is not the only di-
lemma for those who wish to draw policy conclusions for developed countries. 
The rather atheoretic approach of the macroeconomic literature on education 
and growth has attracted a certain amount of criticism. One argument, used by 
Topel (1999), is that the measured effect of the initial level of human capital is 
often too large to be credible. The underlying assumption here is that educa-
tion’s effects are mostly accounted for by examining the correlation between 
education and earnings at the individual level. The models of the new growth 
theory, reviewed in section 2 above, indicate that this view of education’s role 
is perhaps too narrow. 
Nevertheless, the perspective of labour economics remains of interest. Start-
ing with Pritchett (1996), researchers have noted the implications of traditional 
earnings functions for analyses at the cross-country level. If an individual’s 
education contributes directly to their productivity, in the manner envisaged by 
labour economists, we should expect to observe a correlation between the 
change in output per worker and the change in average educational attainment, 
at least after controlling for other variables. Furthermore, it should be possible 
to detect this effect regardless of whether or not the initial level of educational 
attainment determines growth.20 
This argument has shifted the focus of research towards regressions that re-
late growth to the change in educational attainment, rather than its level. Sev-
                                                          
20 Problems in discriminating between the two effects are discussed in Cannon (2000). 
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eral well-known studies have found the correlation to be surprisingly weak; 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Pritchett (1996) both come to this conclusion 
for a large sample of countries.21 Benhabib and Spiegel do find a statistically 
significant correlation between the level of educational attainment and growth 
for the wealthiest third of the sample (their Table 5, model 2) but no connection 
between the change in attainment and growth in a larger sample. One reason 
for this may be the effect of outliers, as discussed in Temple (1999b, 2001). 
There are a number of other problems that dictate caution in reading these 
papers. One is the specification chosen for the relation between years of 
schooling and output. The specification adopted by Benhabib and Spiegel im-
plicitly assumes that the returns to an extra year of schooling are much higher 
at low levels of schooling than high levels. As Topel (1999) points out, this 
runs contrary to the standard semi-logarithmic formulation for earnings func-
tions, which in its simplest form assumes that the returns to an extra year of 
schooling are independent of the level of schooling. When growth regressions 
are specified in a way that is more consistent with this idea, the evidence for an 
effect of education is rather stronger.  
Krueger and Lindahl (1999) have argued convincingly that another impor-
tant problem is likely to be measurement error. The difficulty is that a specifi-
cation based on an aggregate production function (as in Benhabib and Spiegel) 
typically seeks to explain growth using the change in educational attainment, 
but first-differencing the education variable in this way will usually exacerbate 
the effect of any measurement errors in the data. 
To support this argument, Krueger and Lindahl examine the correlation be-
tween two different measures of the change in average years of schooling that 
have been used in the literature. The correlation is low enough to suggest that a 
substantial component of the measured change in educational attainment is 
uninformative noise. As a consequence, regressions that use the change in edu-
cation to explain growth will tend to understate its importance.22  
The case for seeing measurement error as an important part of the story has 
been considerably strengthened by the impressively careful and detailed work 
of de la Fuente and Domenech (2000). Unusually, they restrict attention 
throughout to OECD members. Their close examination of standard data sets 
reveals that schooling levels for some countries appear implausible; some of 
the figures for average years of schooling display surprising short-run volatil-
ity; and others appear to give a misleading view of trends. Other writers, nota-
                                                          
21  This finding is also associated with a number of panel data studies using fixed effects, but 
these results should almost certainly be discounted. Researchers using panels typically do 
not allow for lags in the effect of variables like enrollment rates. In any case, given the way 
the education data are constructed, the time series variation will sometimes be too noisy to 
draw sensible conclusions. 
22  Note, though, that measurement error in other explanatory variables (notably physical capi-
tal) could bias the coefficient on education in the opposite direction. 
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bly Steedman (1996), have also noted inconsistencies in the way data on hu-
man capital are collected and compared. 
By drawing on national sources and more recent figures compiled by the 
OECD, de la Fuente and Domenech compile a new and more reliable data set 
for years of schooling in OECD member countries. In their empirical work, 
they find that changes in output and educational attainment are positively cor-
related, even in panel estimates that include country and time fixed effects. 
This supports the idea that, where previous researchers have failed to detect an 
effect, this may be due to measurement error. 
More recently, Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001) have extended the de la 
Fuente and Domenech database forward in time, and estimated the effect of 
education over 1971-98 for 21 OECD members using the Pooled Mean Group 
(PMG) estimator. The key advantage of this approach is that, compared to tra-
ditional methods of estimating panel data models, it allows greater flexibility in 
the short-run dynamics. Using the PMG estimator, Bassanini and Scarpetta’s 
preferred estimate is an elasticity of 0.6 for output per capita in response to 
additional years of schooling. This implies that, at the sample mean of average 
schooling of about ten years, an extra year of average schooling would raise 
output per capita by six per cent. This effect is similar in magnitude to that 
found in microeconomic estimates based on survey data, of the type reviewed 
earlier. 
Engelbrecht (1997) also finds significant effects of education on OECD 
growth. His empirical model controls for the effects of R & D spending, and is 
estimated using the education data of Barro and Lee (1993) for the population 
aged 25 and over. Again, these results suggest that the growth of productivity is 
related to the change in average years of schooling, as one would expect if mi-
croeconomic estimates of the return to schooling are picking up a genuine pro-
ductivity effect. In a separate set of estimates, Engelbrecht also finds support 
for the idea that the level of education plays a role in technological catch-up; he 
finds productivity growth is more rapid where countries have a higher level of 
average schooling. 
Overall, this literature is beginning to suggest that there is a correlation be-
tween changes in education and growth, of the kind that most labour econo-
mists would expect to observe. This is reassuring, but there are a number of 
interesting open questions. One obvious question mark surrounds the interpre-
tation of the earlier results that related growth to the initial level of attainment, 
rather than the change in attainment. Growth studies for the OECD that allow a 
role for both possibilities simultaneously are yet to appear. This omission may 
be inevitable given the small sample size, but it should not lead one to underes-
timate the possible role for human capital in technological catch-up or the crea-
tion of new ideas, either of which could yield a relationship between the level 
of education and subsequent growth. 
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There is another reason why the effect of the initial level of education re-
mains of some interest. Studying the relation between the change in output and 
the change in education remains somewhat vulnerable to the charge that causal-
ity runs from output (or anticipated output) to education, and not simply vice 
versa.23 To a large extent, long-run changes in average educational attainment 
are driven by government policy. It seems plausible that as output and tax 
revenues increase, governments will often allocate more resources to educa-
tion, and attainment will rise for a transitional period. 
Yet the argument that panel data results, such as those of de la Fuente and 
Domenech (2000), are driven by reverse causation is rather less strong than it 
may appear at first. This is a key advantage of their use of data on average 
years of schooling in the population, rather than enrollment rates. Given that 
new entrants are typically a small fraction of the labour force, average attain-
ment will change only very slowly in response to any change in educational 
provision. It therefore seems rather unlikely that reverse causation explains the 
panel data findings. 
Where does this leave us? Earlier in the survey, we saw the important quali-
fications that surround microeconomic estimates of the social returns to school-
ing. Ultimately we would like the cross-country evidence to shed light on the 
accuracy of these estimates. In practice, we are likely to remain some way short 
of this goal, at least in the absence of better data. The aggregate evidence is 
currently too fragile to draw any strong conclusions about the possible extent of 
social returns. 
Even so, the results we have provide some grounds for optimism, and it is 
reassuring that several recent studies find education to be important, despite the 
likely presence of measurement error. This suggests that better data, and more 
sophisticated methods, may yet lead to a steady improvement in the precision 
of our estimates of the growth effects of education. The prospects for this 
should not be exaggerated, but there is certainly more reason to be hopeful now 
than in the early days of the literature, when the various sets of estimates were 
hard to reconcile into any kind of coherent story. 
Another advantage retained by the macroeconomic approach, compared to 
micro estimates, is that we can explore indirect effects of education, notably 
those working through investment. These effects are present in the model in-
troduced by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and may have wider relevance. 
Two-sector models of endogenous growth, such as those reviewed in Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1995, ch. 5), typically yield a steady-state in which there is an 
equilibrium ratio of human capital to physical capital. An immediate conse-
                                                          
23  The two-way interaction between growth and education is discussed in more detail by Min-
cer (1996) and Bils and Klenow (2000). Bils and Klenow argue that the direction of causal-
ity may be uncertain even when attention is restricted to the growth effect of the initial level 
of education. 
 27
quence is that a rise in educational attainment will eventually be met with a 
corresponding rise in the stock of physical capital. 
Analysing the consequences for welfare is not wholly straightforward. 
Growth economists have not yet developed and calibrated a model which de-
rives overall output and welfare effects of education based on sensible micro-
foundations for investment.24 This may explain why the effect is ignored by 
most interpretations of the empirical literature on education and growth. For 
now, it is important to be aware that growth regressions and growth accounting, 
by using capital growth as one of the conditioning variables, may understate 
the total impact of an increase in educational attainment on output per worker. 
The probable magnitude of this effect, and its significance for welfare, remain 
uncertain. 
3.4 Human capital externalities 
One important motivation for looking at the cross-country data is the possible 
presence of externalities to human capital. As we have seen, however, the em-
pirical growth literature gives rather imprecise answers about the social returns 
to education. In this section, I will briefly review theoretical work on this topic, 
and then discuss some innovative recent evidence based on microeconomic 
data sets. 
Interest in human capital externalities was revived by Lucas (1988, 1990). 
One of his arguments was that, in the absence of such externalities, it is diffi-
cult to reconcile observed pressures for migration from poor to rich countries 
with the absence of massive capital flows in the other direction. He also drew 
on the work of Jacobs (1969) to argue that such externalities are a natural ex-
planation for the existence of cities. 
In more recent work, Acemoglu (1996) has provided an ingenious justifica-
tion for the presence of externalities. His theory is based on microeconomic 
foundations, and so is particularly worthy of attention. In his model, firms and 
workers make investments in physical capital and human capital respectively, 
before production begins. Production requires a partnership between a firm and 
a worker, but when firms or workers make their respective investments, they do 
not know the identity of their future partner. A key assumption of the model is 
that firms and workers are then brought together via a matching process that is 
imperfect, perhaps because searching for partners is costly. 
Acemoglu shows how the structure of the model yields an important result: 
an increase in the average level of human capital can have a positive effect on 
the private return to human capital, at least over some region. The intuition is 
as follows: say that a subset of workers decides to acquire more human capital. 
                                                          
24  Although some theoretical work has started to appear: Masters (1998) analyses the effi-
ciency of investments in human and physical capital in a bilateral search context. 
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This will raise average human capital, and anticipation of this encourages firms 
to make greater investments in physical capital. Since the matching process is 
inefficient, the firms who have invested more are not necessarily matched with 
the workers who have invested more in human capital. As a result, some of the 
other workers will gain from the increase in average human capital, since they 
are matched with firms using more physical capital than before; and in this 
sense the average level of human capital has an external benefit. 
Work of this kind has helped to motivate the recent search for externalities, 
using survey data sets that include individuals who live in different cities or 
regions. The idea is to estimate human capital earnings functions in the normal 
way, but including a new variable, the average level of schooling in each indi-
vidual’s city or region. The central idea is that, if there are significant external-
ities to human capital, individuals should earn more when they work in those 
cities with a higher average level of schooling. The exercise will miss external-
ities that work at the national level, perhaps through social structures or institu-
tions, but it remains of considerable interest. 
Several studies based on this idea have been carried out for the US. The ini-
tial results of Rauch (1993) appeared promising. Consider two otherwise simi-
lar individuals living in two different cities, the second city with a population 
that has an extra year of average schooling. His estimates suggested that an 
individual living in the second city could expect to gain a wage premium of 
around 3%, an effect large enough to be worthy of further investigation. 
Unfortunately, as Ciccone et al. (1999) point out, there is an important ar-
gument against interpreting the observed wage premium as solely driven by ex-
ternalities. Differences in average years of schooling across cities are likely to 
be associated with differences in the relative supplies of skilled and unskilled 
labour. These relative supply effects may give rise to an apparent wage pre-
mium for average schooling even in the absence of externalities. 
The empirical work of Ciccone et al. (1999) supports this proposition. When 
they follow Rauch and do not allow for relative supply effects, they are able to 
obtain a high and precise estimate of the social return to education. In a more 
general approach, which builds in a role for supply effects, the measured exter-
nalities are greatly reduced; indeed it is not possible to reject the hypothesis 
that externalities are absent altogether. Related work by Acemoglu and Angrist 
(1999) also indicates that the overall social returns to education may be close to 
the private returns, this time using the variation in average schooling across US 
states to capture the effects of externalities. 
3.5 Wider benefits of education 
So far, the survey has only considered the effects of education on productivity, 
yet it is clear that the benefits of education are likely to be more far-reaching. 
The traditional case for education is that it makes a fundamental contribution to 
 29
personal development, and probably to the health of societies more generally. 
In thinking about public provision, it is crucial to remember that education may 
have significant welfare benefits that are not captured in the models and data 
typically analysed by economists and governments. 
These include even the benefits of education that accrue directly to indi-
viduals. It is plausible that education has both an immediate consumption bene-
fit and a long-term effect on life satisfaction, other things equal. The difficulty 
here is that it is much harder to measure well-being in a meaningful way than it 
is to measure output of goods and services, and economists are only just start-
ing to investigate well-being and its determinants. 
In an innovative paper, Blanchflower and Oswald (2000) report estimates of 
‘happiness equations’, regressions that relate survey measures of well-being to 
individual characteristics. They find that educational attainment is associated 
with greater happiness, even when controlling for family income. Such findings 
could have important implications for education policy. For example, it is quite 
possible that the extent of an individual’s education has a positive effect on the 
well-being of others, in which case self-interested individuals may tend to un-
der-invest in education from society’s point of view. Alternatively, education 
may affect happiness because it influences perceptions of status relative to oth-
ers, in which case the overall welfare benefits of education may be less than the 
results of Blanchflower and Oswald seem to imply. 
Education policy also has implications for society as a whole. Some econo-
mists may feel that these wider benefits lie outside the remit of the subject, but 
this argument would mean departing from the orthodox definition of economics 
-  namely the study of the relation between the allocation of scarce resources 
and human welfare. Educational provision may affect public health, crime, the 
environment, parenting, and political and community participation. Some of 
these effects are discussed in more detail in OECD (1998, ch. 4), Behrman and 
Stacey (1997) and Wolfe and Haveman (2000). All of these wider benefits 
could feed back into economic performance, which reinforces the case for a 
much broader view of education’s role. 
3.6 A tentative summary of the evidence 
At this point, one may be left wondering what the evidence ultimately achieves 
in terms of lessons for policy. The most useful perspective is probably to com-
bine the various strands of evidence and see whether they form a coherent 
whole, despite the problems inherent in each. 
Labour economists seem to be agreed that the private rate of return to a 
year’s extra schooling is typically between 5% and 15%. Working under simi-
lar assumptions, growth accountants find that increases in educational attain-
ment account for perhaps a fifth of growth in output per worker. 
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Labour economics and growth accounting have a relatively long history, and 
the strengths and weaknesses of the available evidence are well understood. It 
is possible that both approaches overstate the social benefits of education, per-
haps because of signalling effects. Acting in the other direction, the estimates 
provided by this research may understate the role of education, because they 
rarely allow measurement of externalities, or quantify the importance for pro-
ductivity of an improved matching between workers and jobs, or incorporate 
the more general mechanisms connecting education and growth that are found 
in theoretical models. 
The great strength of the emerging macroeconomic literature is that, at least 
in principle, it could provide a direct test of the productivity benefits. As we 
have seen, however, this field has significant weaknesses of its own. Estimates 
that are sufficiently accurate and robust to allow confident conclusions are 
some way off. That may have to wait until growth economists have longer 
spans of data to work with, and greater skill at matching a variety of possible 
statistical techniques to the question at hand. 
With these caveats in mind, a brief summary of the macroeconomic evi-
dence may be useful. Although in some ways such an exercise is rather prema-
ture, it should at least prevent the unwary from jumping to an over-hasty con-
clusion based on the reading of one or two papers alone. That would be an easy 
mistake to make: over the last ten years, growth researchers have bounced from 
identifying quite dramatic effects of education, to calling into question the exis-
tence of any effect at all. 
More recent research is placed somewhere between these two extremes, but 
perhaps leaning closer to the original findings that education has a major im-
pact. In examining the studies that have not detected an effect, we have some 
convincing reasons (measurement error, outliers, incorrect specification) to 
doubt such results. The balance of recent evidence points to productivity effects 
of education which are at least as large as those identified by labour eco-
nomists. This should reassure us that most countries are not over-providing 
education, but a fuller discussion of policy implications will be deferred until 
section 5. 
4. Social capital and growth 
In this section, I provide some discussion of the emerging idea of ‘social capi-
tal’, and its potential role in the growth process. The literature on social capital 
is still relatively undeveloped, and in reviewing the empirical work on this 
topic, I will draw heavily on a few key papers. The nature of the surrounding 
discussion is necessarily broader and more speculative than elsewhere in the 
survey, and this reflects some of the uncertainties currently surrounding the 
field, which should be borne in mind throughout. 
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Before describing the underlying ideas in more detail, it may be helpful to 
place them in the wider context of empirical growth research. The aim is to 
indicate why social capital might yet be a useful concept, given that views on 
its importance currently differ greatly - certainly compared to views on educa-
tion, where there is fairly general agreement that education matters, even if our 
measurements of its effect are imprecise.  
Ideally, researchers studying development and growth would like to find a 
set of policy interventions sufficient to raise living standards and welfare. It is 
sometimes argued that this is an impossible goal, partly because the circum-
stances of each country are unique. A less extreme position is that growth re-
search can give us some insight into possible generalisations, by telling us 
about the average pattern; at the same time, it should be recognised that any 
proposed set of ‘sufficient’ conditions will never be universal. 
One way of making our generalisations more widely applicable is to dis-
criminate more finely between societies, by introducing extra dimensions into 
our analysis of the growth process. This cannot be pushed too far, since we 
only have a limited set of countries, and a limited time span, from which to 
draw evidence. The central challenge for growth researchers is to identify the 
dimensions which are most relevant for growth, without endlessly multiplying 
the possibilities in such a way that we ultimately ask too much of the data. At 
the moment, the hope appears to be that a coherent picture will ultimately 
emerge through a gradual accumulation of evidence, as empirical researchers 
both introduce new variables and indicate that some earlier proposals should be 
discarded. The fundamental problem here is that the most general model, which 
in principle would allow us to discriminate easily between the competing hy-
potheses, has already become too large to be informative (Levine and Renelt 
1992). 
In this context, in explaining growth, it makes sense to concentrate on those 
dimensions of societies which have a strong prior claim on our attention. 
Among the dimensions recently proposed for further investigation, one stands 
out as both promising and - in terms of its prior claim - relatively controversial. 
The concept of ‘social capital’ appears to be a potentially formidable way of 
discriminating between countries and their growth prospects. It provides a use-
ful way to think about aspects of societies which, though difficult to measure 
and incorporate into formal models, may be important determinants of long-run 
economic success. For some economists (not all) the intuition that ‘society mat-
ters’ is strong enough to outweigh the current absence of much in the way of a 
theoretical underpinning. 
There is a long academic tradition that something is not fully understood un-
til it can be measured, and the concept of social capital presents serious prob-
lems of definition, let alone measurement. But in this respect, it is interesting to 
note the comment of Lucas (1988, p. 35) about the early days of human capital 
theory. He wrote that “the idea of human capital may have seemed ethereal 
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when it was first introduced - at least, it did to me - but after two decades of 
research applications of human capital theory we have learned to ‘see’ it in a 
wide variety of phenomena”. The possible analogy with the present and future 
status of social capital should be clear. 
Overall, it is easy to see why growth economists and others have started to 
emphasise social capital only very recently, even though the basic ideas have a 
long intellectual history. In this part of the survey, I will discuss some of the 
most recent work, starting with a discussion of the nature of social capital (sec-
tion 4.1). This provides a necessary backdrop for section 4.2, which covers the 
limited cross-country evidence so far available, most of it based on survey evi-
dence on willingness to trust. The implications for policy may seem rather 
meagre, but it should be remembered that this literature is still in its early 
stages. Section 4.3 will discuss some of the questions that remain to be an-
swered. 
4.1 What is social capital? 
It is widely acknowledged that social capital needs to be carefully defined, if it 
is to prove anything more than suggestive in thinking about growth. One of the 
best known and most representative definitions can be found in the highly in-
fluential work of Putnam (1993): “social capital...refers to features of social 
organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the effi-
ciency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (p. 167). 
As Woolcock (1998) and others have noted, this is useful but comes close to 
defining social capital in terms of its function, so that it becomes difficult to 
separate analytically the sources of social capital from its consequences. As an 
example, social capital in the form of trust may be created by participation in 
civic associations, but these associations could themselves be regarded as an 
important form of social capital. The importance of this point is reinforced 
when one considers that social capital may also have costs: one person’s valu-
able network may be another’s restrictive interest group. 
Many discussions of social capital, including those of Putnam (1993), 
Schuller (2000) and Woolcock (2000), associate it with a resource that is useful 
in achieving common objectives. For example, the suggested definition of 
Woolcock (2000, p. 5) is that “social capital refers to the norms and networks 
that facilitate collective action”. This emphasis on collective action may be pro-
blematic for economists who wish to make wider use of the idea. As I will dis-
cuss later, an understanding of the formation of social capital is likely to re-
quire an understanding of its value as a resource to individuals (Glaeser 2000). 
This can easily conflict with a definition of social capital that emphasises its 
role in collective action, in the usual sense of the latter term. For example, an 
entrepreneur who gains knowledge from participating in various networks is 
arguably benefiting from social capital, and this benefit occurs, and may be 
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worthy of analysis, even if the entrepreneur does not share goals, objectives or 
outcomes with others. 
A broader exploration of the term can be found in Woolcock (1998). He 
proposes a scheme in which it has four dimensions, roughly corresponding to 
(i) the extent of horizontal associations; (ii) the nature of social ties within 
communities; (iii) the nature of the relation between civil society and the state; 
and (iv) the quality of governing institutions. Independently of the social capi-
tal literature, economists have made some progress under category (iv), in ana-
lysing the growth impact of the quality of institutions (for instance Knack and 
Keefer 1995). At least for present purposes, it is not clear that bringing this 
work under the umbrella of social capital will yield extra insight.25 In any case, 
measuring the benefits of good institutions is arguably a less urgent task than 
formulating practical advice on how to improve bad ones, and the growth lit-
erature does not have much to offer here. 
With these points in mind, this survey will mainly restrict itself to recent 
empirical work that uses the extent of trust in a society as an indicator of its 
underlying social capital. It should already be clear that this is an imperfect and 
simplistic way of capturing the ideas of Putnam and others. Trust may be deter-
mined by social capital, but also by other aspects of societies; and the extent of 
trust may be influenced, in very different ways, by all four of the dimensions of 
social capital identified by Woolcock. Yet a focus on trust has one key advan-
tage: it can potentially be measured in a way that is comparable across coun-
tries, as we will see below. 
4.2 Empirical evidence 
The most important macroeconomic evidence on social capital takes the World 
Values Survey as its starting point. The 1981 survey is based on responses from 
thousands of individuals across 21 market economies, while the 1990-91 sur-
vey covers 28 market economies. Overall, 29 market economies are covered at 
least once. The selection of respondents is not completely random, but adjust-
ments to take this into account are available.26 Among the issues addressed in 
the surveys, economists have mainly focused on a question designed to capture 
willingness to trust. Respondents were asked “Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing 
with people?”. The percentage of respondents in each nation replying “most 
                                                          
25  Following Abramovitz (1986), Temple and Johnson (1998) argue in favour of the use of the 
term “social capability” when referring to social arrangements and institutions defined more 
broadly. There are likely to be important benefits, in terms of clarity and rigour, from keep-
ing the term “social capital” narrowly defined, as Putnam has advocated. 
26  For a more detailed discussion, see Knack and Keefer (1997). 
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people can be trusted” forms a potentially useful index of trust.27 Table 1 shows 
values for this index, TRUST, for those OECD countries covered in the survey, 
and also for a small selection of less developed countries. 
Table 1 
A measure of trust 
Data for some OECD members 
Norway  61.2  Ireland  40.2 
Finland   57.2   Korea   38.0   
Sweden   57.1   Spain   34.5   
Denmark   56.0   Austria   31.8   
Canada   49.6   Belgium   30.2   
Australia   47.8   Germany   29.8   
Netherlands   46.2   Italy   26.3   
United States   45.4   France   24.8   
United Kingdom   44.4   Portugal   21.4   
Switzerland   43.2   Mexico   17.7   
Iceland   41.6   Turkey   10.0   
Japan   40.8         
           
Non-OECD members 
India   34.3   Nigeria   22.9  
South Africa   30.5   Chile   22.7  
Argentina   27.0   Brazil     6.7  
Source: Knack and Keefer (1997). 
Clearly, measurement error is potentially a major problem in using such data. 
For the twenty countries with TRUST values for both 1981 and 1990, the cor-
relation between the two is 0.91, which suggests a limited role for transitory 
measurement errors. This leaves open the possibility, however, that the variable 
is an accurate measure of something other than the extent of trust. Knack and 
Keefer (1997) report on an interesting experiment, that provides independent 
evidence on the possible validity of the TRUST measure. In the experiment, a 
large number of wallets containing $50 were deliberately ‘lost’ in a number of 
cities. The percentage of ‘lost’ wallets that are returned to their owners in each 
country has a correlation with TRUST of 0.67, providing a tentative indication 
                                                          
27  Note that someone’s response to the survey question may tell us more about their own 
trustworthiness, rather than a view of trust in their country as a whole. Even then, the pat-
tern of responses may form a useful guide to the prevalence of trust in a particular country 
(see for instance Glaeser 2000). 
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that people are genuinely more trustworthy in countries with high values of the 
TRUST index. 
Knack and Keefer (1997) also construct a second index, CIVIC, designed to 
capture the strength of norms of civic cooperation. The index is constructed by 
averaging across five questions, addressing the attitudes of the respondents to 
such things as fraudulent benefit claims and avoidance of fares on public trans-
port. Perhaps surprisingly, this index shows relatively little variation across 
OECD countries, although it is positively correlated with TRUST. In what fol-
lows I will concentrate on the empirical evidence relating to the TRUST vari-
able; Knack and Keefer note that results are broadly similar when CIVIC is 
used in its place. 
Before turning to the evaluation of the results, it is worth examining the data 
in Table 1 more closely. Most of the empirical work is based on samples that 
contain a small number of less developed countries, as well as OECD mem-
bers; as a result, one might be concerned that poorer countries are responsible 
for most of the identifying variation in the TRUST variable. The evidence of 
Table 1, however, suggests that there is substantial variation in TRUST across 
OECD members.28 
The index of trust is used by both Knack and Keefer (1997) and La Porta et 
al. (1997). Both these studies report cross-country regressions that relate a wide 
variety of dependent variables to trust and a number of controls. In many cases, 
the results should be regarded as indicating the existence of associations, rather 
than establishing a causal relationship. 
The evidence for causality is arguably strongest in the regressions seeking to 
explain growth in output per head. La Porta et al. (1997) report that the trust 
index is weakly associated with growth over 1970-93, although the explanatory 
power of their growth regression is low and the sample includes some countries 
that were centrally planned during this period. This suggests that one should be 
quite careful about drawing conclusions for OECD members. Knack and 
Keefer exclude socialist countries and focus on a shorter period, 1980-92. They 
find stronger results. Controlling for initial income per head, a human capital 
variable, and the relative price of investment goods, they find that a one stan-
dard deviation change in the trust index is associated with a change in the 
growth rate of 0.56 of one standard deviation. In alternative terms, a level of 
TRUST that is ten percentage points higher (slightly less than one standard 
deviation) is associated with an annual growth rate that is higher by 0.8 per-
centage points. 
As always in the empirical growth field, one should be careful not to regard 
these growth effects as ones that will persist indefinitely. It would perhaps be 
rather implausible to assert that countries will grow at permanently different 
                                                          
28  The scatter plots presented in Knack and Keefer are also reassuring in this respect, as they 
suggest that the partial correlations between growth, investment and TRUST that will be 
discussed later are not simply driven by the inclusion of a few less developed countries. 
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rates, simply because of differing levels of trust. The correlations highlighted 
by La Porta et al. (1997) and Knack and Keefer (1997) are better seen as indi-
cations of a possible role for social capital in determining the steady-state level 
of income. In other words, changes in social capital might affect growth rates, 
but only for a transitional period. This qualification is also true of almost any 
other variable that one might use to explain growth, and it should be remem-
bered that transitional effects may easily be large enough to be worth consider-
able attention. 
Knack and Keefer carry out a number of robustness tests. When influential 
outliers are deleted, or growth analysed over longer periods (1960-92 and 
1970-92), the point estimate of the growth effect is roughly halved, but remains 
statistically significant (see their Table II). They do note that, over the longer 
time span, the effect of TRUST is not always robust to the inclusion of other 
explanatory variables in the growth equation. 
The evidence suggests that the effect of TRUST is large enough to be wor-
thy of further investigation. It is important to note, however, that results are 
typically less strong when attention is restricted to a sample of OECD coun-
tries. Also using World Values Survey data, Helliwell (1996) found a negative 
effect of trust on growth in a sample of 17 OECD members. Knack (2000) re-
ports that in a sample restricted to 25 OECD members, the effect of trust is 
imprecisely measured, and the hypothesis that it has no effect cannot be re-
jected at conventional significance levels. 
These are quite small samples, so in a sense it is not surprising that trust is 
insignificant when attention is restricted to the OECD. Knack (2000) makes 
two additional points in relation to the OECD results. First, as in Knack and 
Keefer (1997), there is evidence that the effect of trust is greater in low income 
countries, based on an interaction term in the growth regressions. Even if one is 
sceptical that trust matters for the high income members of the OECD, it may 
still play an important role in poorer countries like Mexico and Turkey. Sec-
ondly, Knack (2000) reports a statistically significant and positive correlation 
between investment and TRUST within an OECD sample, supporting the idea 
that trust plays some role even for richer nations. 
Both La Porta et al. (1997) and Knack and Keefer (1997) report evidence on 
other interesting associations between TRUST and indicators of performance. 
La Porta et al. find strong positive associations between TRUST and a number 
of measures of government performance, including the effectiveness of the 
judiciary and the quality of the bureaucracy (their Table 2). Knack and Keefer 
present very similar results (their Table V). They also provide some evidence 
that the effect of trust works through raising the share of investment in GDP. 
These results are intriguing, but one should be careful to avoid jumping to 
strong conclusions about the importance of trust, or other aspects of social 
capital. A fundamental problem is that the extent of trust may well be deter-
mined by, or correlated with, other aspects of societies that are omitted from 
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the growth regressions. For instance, it may be that corruption or weak legal 
enforcement lowers trust and, for quite independent reasons, the growth rate. 
As Knack and Keefer note, one could even tell a story in which trust is a prod-
uct of optimism in societies that are performing well in economic terms.  
One obvious variable that might be correlated with social capital is educa-
tional attainment, and this is particularly interesting from the point of view of 
the present survey. La Porta et al. (1997, p. 336) argue that trust has a positive 
effect on educational achievement, but it should be clear that causality may run 
in the opposite direction. Knack and Keefer report a strong correlation (r=0.83) 
between TRUST and an estimate of average years of schooling for 1980, and 
note that “education may strengthen trust and civic norms, for example, if igno-
rance breeds distrust, or if learning reduces uncertainty about the behavior of 
others, or if students are taught to behave cooperatively” (p. 1270). If we see 
trust as endogenous to the extent and quality of education, we have the begin-
nings of a story about externalities to education, of the kind briefly discussed 
earlier. 
4.3 The future for social capital research 
Given that interesting and suggestive evidence for the importance of social 
capital has been compiled in so short a time, further research on social capital 
appears to have a bright future. To live up to this promise, however, there are at 
least two potentially difficult questions that will need to be addressed. The first 
question concerns the origins and formation of social capital; the second, the 
precise mechanisms by which social capital, once formed, gives rise to par-
ticular microeconomic and macroeconomic outcomes. 
It should be clear that, to incorporate the ideas of the social capital literature 
in policy advice, we will often need to understand how social capital is created, 
and how it might sometimes be undermined. In line with the usual methods of 
economists, Glaeser (2000) has convincingly argued that we need to give more 
attention to the value of social capital as a resource for individuals, as well as 
for communities as a whole. It seems unlikely that social capital is best under-
stood as simply an unintended by-product of other decisions. With this in mind, 
we need a model that captures the incentives of individuals to form or under-
mine social capital, and which also shows how these incentives are affected by 
policy. Without such a model, our knowledge of policy implications will re-
main incomplete, however strong our intuition and evidence that social capital 
matters. 
It can seem that social capital resists the usual methods of analysis of 
economists, given that it is usually understood to be a property of groups rather 
than individuals. The Glaeser argument works well for the ‘networks’ aspect of 
social capital, since participation in networks can be modelled as the outcome 
of individual investment decisions; the argument is less clearly applicable to 
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other aspects of social capital, such as social norms. Yet even for social norms, 
such as the value of trustworthiness, it is possible to analyse their creation and 
evolution in terms of individual decisions to observe (or not to observe) the 
prevailing norm. Economists have recently started to give greater attention to 
constructing models in which social norms are endogenous, and it seems prob-
able that this work will yield some valuable insights.29 
 A second, and related, question concerns the precise mechanisms by which 
social capital, once in place, affects economic outcomes. Again, formal model-
ling may be useful. For example, Zak and Knack (1999) present a model in 
which agents divide their time between production and verifying the actions of 
those they transact with. Their model captures the simple idea that in low trust 
societies, some resources and time are diverted to verification, and this results 
in lower output. 
It will be very difficult to discriminate between alternative theoretical mod-
els using macroeconomic data, and the prospects for further cross-country em-
pirical research appear limited. Studies based at the level of firms or regions 
may ultimately be more informative, and some interesting work has already 
started to appear. Guiso et al. (2000) argue that one of the best testing grounds 
for the importance of social capital may lie in the financial sector, since it is 
here that trust may be especially relevant to economic activity. They study this 
effect within Italy, using a measure of civic engagement (essentially voter turn-
out in certain elections) as a proxy for social capital, as in Putnam (1993). Us-
ing large samples of households and firms, they find that their measure of civic 
engagement helps explain variation in financial practices across Italian regions, 
even when controlling for different levels of development. 
Such studies are likely to play an increasingly important role in the wider 
debate on the importance of social capital. Sceptics will remain unconvinced by 
the economic importance of trust and other aspects of societies (networks, 
norms, participation) until we have a more complete and detailed story describ-
ing their connection to economic outcomes, supported by reliable evidence. 
5. Summary and conclusions 
This section rounds off the paper with a discussion of how these areas of re-
search might inform future policy. I will look at education first, but care is 
needed here. Griliches (1997, p. S339) notes that for academic economists, an 
emphasis on the importance of education for economic growth “may be some-
what self-serving” and occasionally in the literature one does come across a 
paper which echoes to the sound of grinding axes. This is particularly true in 
                                                          
29  Many references to research in this area can be found in Zak and Knack (1999). 
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reading opposing assessments of the signalling argument, where the lack of 
reliable evidence seems to encourage, rather than discourage, strong views. 
In assessing the empirical evidence for productivity benefits of education, it 
is quite possible that an overall judgement is frequently contaminated by a keen 
awareness of wider benefits of education that are not captured in economic 
data. After all, one could probably construct a viable case for much educational 
expenditure entirely based on its implications for personal development, inde-
pendent of any productivity effects. It is worth quoting Weiss (1995, p. 151): 
Education does not have to be justified solely on the basis of its effect on la-
bour productivity. This was certainly not the argument given by Plato or de 
Tocqueville and need not be ours. Students are not taught civics, or art, or mu-
sic solely in order to improve their labour productivity, but rather to enrich 
their lives and make them better citizens. 
Most economists, appropriately enough for practitioners of the ‘dismal sci-
ence’, have concentrated on examining a rather more narrow case for educa-
tion, in terms of its contribution to productivity growth. As we have seen, the 
weight of evidence points to significant productivity effects, but the degree of 
uncertainty is large, and even a lower bound is surprisingly difficult to estab-
lish. 
The evidence from labour economics has the greatest weight of experience, 
time and academic firepower behind it, and this suggests that it would be a mis-
take to summarise the macroeconomic results in isolation. Although a recon-
ciliation of these two literatures is in its early stages, the correlation across 
countries between measures of human capital and growth is arguably robust 
enough to support the belief that earnings functions pick up genuine productiv-
ity effects, and not simply the effects of signalling or omitted characteristics. 
That is reassuring, but it leaves many questions open for policy-makers. 
There is likely to be pervasive heterogeneity in rates of return across individu-
als, let alone across countries. A greater understanding of the pattern of hetero-
geneity will lead to better policy decisions, but on this subject the macroeco-
nomic literature surveyed here is necessarily silent. Evidence compiled by la-
bour economists will be far more useful in this respect.30 
Other limitations of the macroeconomic evidence are worth noting. Growth 
regressions are best thought of as picking up an average effect of schooling, 
and should certainly not be used to conclude that every OECD member is cur-
rently under-providing education. Indeed, the results from growth accounting 
exercises suggest that, although increases in educational provision can yield a 
worthwhile increase in the growth rate, one should not necessarily expect an 
effect that is large relative to current rates of growth. For policy-makers who 
                                                          
30  A special issue of the journal Labour Economics (November 1999) includes studies that 
measure the returns to schooling for a variety of OECD member countries, and thus sheds 
light on the possible heterogeneity across countries. 
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wish to raise the growth rate, policy on education remains a natural place to 
look, but it is by no means a panacea. 
Not only that, one cannot altogether dismiss the possibility of ‘overeduca-
tion’ in some countries, at some levels of education. For example, it is plausible 
that there are some people for whom conventional academic education beyond 
a certain point is ultimately less useful than vocational training. This draws 
attention, once again, to the way in which the unbalanced nature of the existing 
evidence may mislead. We need to learn more about the relative merits of 
schooling and training for different individuals. This will require estimates of 
how returns to schooling vary with personal characteristics, and should also 
involve some consideration of wider benefits. 
In thinking broadly about the overeducation question, it is interesting to 
consider the evolution of educational wage differentials since the late 1970s. 
Even though the relative supply of skilled labour has increased, there has been 
a substantial and well-documented increase in educational wage differentials in 
the UK and the USA, with less pronounced changes in other OECD countries.31 
It seems difficult to explain the evidence for the UK and the US without a 
dominant role for a shift in the relative demands for different types of labour, 
favouring the more educated. 
Much research has focused on the origins of the change in relative labour 
demand, but for policy-makers an equally important question is whether this 
change is generating a rising return mainly to education, or to other characteris-
tics such as innate ability or initiative. Clearly the policy implications are very 
different under the alternative scenarios, yet disentangling the two effects is 
difficult. Existing research often finds that it is the return to ability which is 
rising, but the work of Cawley et al. (1998) suggests that, due to some impor-
tant identification problems, these results are not robust to small changes in 
assumptions. 
It is also the case that overeducation may take time to appear in the data. 
One problem here is that average attainment typically evolves only slowly, and 
so measured returns to education will also change only slowly, and are not nec-
essarily informative on the desirability of current provision. This means that 
evidence on current wage differentials needs to be supplemented by other ap-
proaches, including those discussed in Harmon et al. (2000). 
The recent shifts in differentials also remind us that policy on education has 
distributional consequences (Topel 1997). Given that trade does not seem to 
equalise factor prices across countries, any increase in the relative supply of 
skilled labour is likely to lower the wage premium for the possession of skills. 
                                                          
31  See for instance Katz and Autor (1999), p. 1501-1503. Evidence on recent trends in wage 
dispersion more generally can be found in OECD (1996, ch. 3). 
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In turn this could make an important contribution to reducing income inequa-
lity.32  
To summarise, can we justify the massive amount of resources allocated to 
education by OECD member countries, around $1550 billion in total each 
year? On the available evidence, including recent changes in wage dispersion, 
the arguments for cutting back on this provision seem rather weak. In deciding 
if provision should be expanded, perhaps the key open question is the validity 
of the signalling arguments. More evidence on the signalling debate would be 
extremely helpful in judging the benefits of expanding higher education, one of 
the main changes in provision within the OECD since the 1960s. 
In exploring some of the details of such arguments, empirical evidence is 
not the only way forward. Theory and calibration exercises may also shed light 
on these issues. An example is the interesting implication of new growth theory 
that individuals may under-invest in education, because those who later go into 
research careers do not capture all the benefits of the new ideas that they help 
to create. This provides the beginnings of an argument for subsidising educa-
tion in engineering and science, at least at those levels (perhaps PhDs, or post-
docs) where a high proportion of individuals subsequently go into research and 
development activity. Romer (2000) has recently presented specific policy pro-
posals along these lines. 
The literature on social capital and growth is at an earlier stage than the 
macroeconomic evidence on education, and the policy implications are less 
clear. Indeed, one weakness of the social capital literature, at least in relation to 
richer countries, is that it is currently difficult to see what policy conclusions 
could ever be drawn. What can a policy-maker in Mexico or Turkey actually 
do, confronted with the evidence from the World Values Survey that they gov-
ern a low-trust society? Standard recommendations, such as attempting to 
eliminate corruption and improve the legal system, are nothing new, and make 
good sense quite independently of any emphasis on social capital. 
Perhaps the best answer lies in drawing an analogy with the introduction of 
human capital theory into economics. In its early stages, as Lucas (1988) makes 
clear, human capital seemed a rather ethereal concept, and presumably one with 
little immediate message for education policies. Work on social capital is still 
in its early stages, and as we learn more about what it is, where it comes from, 
and what it does, there may ultimately be implications and conclusions that 
leave our successors wiser in ways that we can only guess at. 
 
                                                          
32  One has to be careful in making this argument, even in a simple model with just two types 
of labour. Inequality depends not only on the skill premium, but also on the relative sup-
plies of skilled and unskilled labour. 
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